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Unconditionally secure non-relativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the
classical and the quantum worlds. But when committing to a string of n bits at once, how far can
we stretch the quantum limits? In this paper, we introduce a framework for quantum schemes where
Alice commits a string of n bits to Bob in such a way that she can only cheat on a bits and Bob can
learn at most b bits of information before the reveal phase. Our results are two-fold: we show by an
explicit construction that in the traditional approach, where the reveal and guess probabilities form
the security criteria, no good schemes can exist: a+b is at least n. If, however, we use a more liberal
criterion of security, the accessible information, we construct schemes where a = 4 log2 n+O(1) and
b = 4, which is impossible classically. We furthermore present a cheat-sensitive quantum bit string
commitment protocol for which we give an explicit tradeoff between Bob’s ability to gain information
about the committed string, and the probability of him being detected cheating.
PACS numbers:
Commitments play an important role in modern day
cryptography. Informally, a commitment allows one
party to prove that she has made up her mind and can-
not change it, while hiding the actual decision until later.
Imagine two mutually distrustful parties Alice and Bob
at distant locations. They can only communicate over
a channel, but want to play the following game: Alice
secretly chooses a bit x. Bob wants to be sure that Al-
ice indeed has made her choice. At the same time, Alice
wants to keep x hidden from Bob until she decides to
reveal x. To convince Bob that she made up her mind,
Alice sends Bob a commitment. From the commitment
alone, Bob cannot deduce x. At a later time, Alice re-
veals x and enables Bob to open the commitment. Bob
can now check if Alice is telling the truth. This scenario
is known as bit commitment.
Bit commitment is a very powerful cryptographic prim-
itive with a wide range of applications. It has been
shown that quantum oblivious transfer (QOT) [1] can
be achieved provided there exists a secure bit com-
mitment scheme [2, 3]. In turn, oblivious transfer is
known to be sufficient for solving the general prob-
lem of secure two-party computation [4, 5]. Commit-
ments are also useful for constructing zero-knowledge
proofs [6]. Furthermore, a bit commitment protocol can
be used to implement secure coin tossing [7]. Classi-
cally, unconditionally secure bit commitment is known
to be impossible. Unfortunately after several quantum
schemes were suggested [8, 9, 10], non-relativistic quan-
tum bit commitment has also been shown to be impos-
sible [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Only very limited degrees
of concealment and binding can be achieved [17]. In the
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face of these negative statements, what can we still hope
to achieve?
A. String Commitment
Here we take a different approach and look at the task
of committing to a string of n bits at once in the setting
where Alice and Bob have unbounded resources. Since
perfect bit commitment is impossible, perfect string
commitment is impossible, too. However, is it possible
to design meaningful string commitment schemes when
we allow for a small ability to cheat on both Alice’s and
Bob’s side? To make this question precise, we introduce
a framework for the classification of string commitments
in terms of the length n of the string, Alice’s ability to
cheat on a bits and Bob’s ability to acquire b bits of
information before the reveal phase. Instead of asking for
a perfectly binding commitment, we allow Alice to reveal
up to 2a strings successfully: Bob will accept any such
string as a valid opening of the commitment. Formally,
we demand that
∑
x∈{0,1}n p
A
x ≤ 2a, where pAx is the
probability that Alice successfully reveals string x during
the reveal phase. Contrary to classical computing, Alice
can always choose to perform a superposition of string
commitments without Bob’s knowledge. Thus even for
a perfectly binding string commitment we would only
demand
∑
x∈{0,1}n p
A
x ≤ 1, since a strategy based on
superpositions is indistinguishable from the “classical”
honest behaviour of choosing a string beforehand and
then committing to it. At the same time, we relax Bob’s
security condition, and allow him to acquire at most b
bits of information before the reveal phase. The nature
of his security definition is crucial to our investigation: If
b determines a bound on his probability to guess Alice’s
string, then we prove that a + b is at least n (up to a
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2small constant). We write (n, a, b)-QBSC for a quantum
bit string commitment protocol where the string has
length n and a and b are the security parameters for
Alice and Bob as explained in detail below. In Section II,
we show
Impossibility of (n, a, b)-QBSC:
Every (n, a, b)-QBSC scheme with a+ b+ c < n is
insecure, where c ≈ 7.61.
Our proof makes use of privacy amplification with two-
universal hash functions. If the protocol is executed
multiple times in parallel, we prove that any quantum
bit string commitment protocol with a + b < n is inse-
cure. We refer to these results as “impossibilities”, as
they show that QBSCs offer almost no advantage over
the trivial classical protocol: Alice first sends b bits of
the n bit string to Bob during the commit phase, and
then supplies him with the remaining n − b bits in the
reveal phase.
The second part of the paper is devoted to the “possi-
bility” of QBSC. If we weaken our standard of security
and measure Bob’s information gain in terms of the
accessible information, it becomes possible to construct
meaningful QBSC protocols with a = 4 log2 n + O(1)
and b = 4. Our protocols are based on the effect of
locking classical information in quantum states [18].
This surprising effect shows that given an initial shared
quantum state, the transmission of ` classical bits can
increase the total amount of correlation by more than `
bits. In Section III, we show
Possibility of (n, a, b)−QBSCIacc :
For n ≥ 3, there exist (n, 4 log2 n+O(1), 4)−QBSCIacc
protocols.
We then consider cheat-sensitive protocols: Even
though Bob is in principle able to gain a large amount
of information on Alice’s committed string, honest Alice
has a decent probability of detecting such an attempt to
cheat the protocol. We give an explicit tradeoff between
Bob’s information gain, and Alice’s ability to catch him
cheating. In Section IV, we show
Possibility of cheat-sensitive
(n, 1, n/2)−QBSCIacc :
There exist a (n, 1, n/2)−QBSCIacc that is
cheat-sensitive against Bob. If Bob is detected cheating
with probability less than ε, then his classical
information gain is less than 4
√
ε log2 d+ 2µ(2
√
ε) with
µ(x) = min{−x log2 x, 1/e}.
B. Related Work
To obtain bit commitment, different restrictions have
been introduced into the model. Salvail [19] showed that,
for any fixed n, secure bit commitment is possible pro-
vided that the sender is not able to perform generalized
measurements on more then n qubits coherently. Large
n coherent measurements are not yet feasible, so his re-
sult provides an implementation which is secure under a
plausible technological assumption. DiVincenzo, Smolin
and Terhal took a different approach [20], showing that
if the bit commitment is forced to be ancilla-free, a type
of asymptotic security is still possible. Bit commitment
is also possible if the adversary’s quantum storage is
bounded [21, 22, 23] or noisy [24]. Classically, introduc-
ing restrictions can also open new possibilities. Cachin,
Cre´peau and Marcil have shown how to implement bit
commitment via oblivious transfer under the assumption
that the size of the receiver’s memory is bounded [25].
Furthermore, the assumption of a noisy channel can be
sufficient for oblivious transfer [26, 27]. A new cryp-
tographic task—called cheat-sensitive bit commitment—
has been studied by Hardy and Kent [28], as well as Aha-
ranov, Ta-Shma, Vazirani and Yao [29]: no restrictions
are placed on the adversary initially, but an honest party
should stand a good chance of catching a cheater. Kent
also showed that bit commitment can be achieved using
relativistic constraints [30].
Classically, string commitment is directly linked to bit
commitment and no interesting protocols are possible.
Kent [31] first asked what kind of quantum string com-
mitment (QBSC) can be achieved. He gave a protocol
under the restrictive assumption that Alice does not com-
mit to a superposition [32]. His protocol was modified for
experimental purposes by Tsurumaru [33].
I. PRELIMINARIES
A. Framework
We first formalize the notion of quantum string com-
mitments in a quantum setting.
Definition 1 An (n, a, b)-Quantum Bit String Commit-
ment (QBSC) is a quantum communication protocol be-
tween two parties, Alice (the committer) and Bob (the
receiver), which consists of two phases and two security
requirements.
• (Commit Phase) Assume that both parties are hon-
est. Alice chooses a string x ∈ {0, 1}n with prob-
ability px. Alice and Bob communicate and at the
end Bob holds state ρx.
• (Reveal Phase) If both parties are honest, Alice and
Bob communicate and at the end Bob learns x. Bob
accepts.
• (Concealing) If Alice is honest, ∑x∈{0,1}n pBx|x ≤
2b, where pBx|x is the probability that Bob correctly
guesses x before the reveal phase.
3• (Binding) If Bob is honest, then for all commit-
ments of Alice:
∑
x∈{0,1}n p
A
x ≤ 2a, where pAx is the
probability that Alice successfully reveals x.
We say that Alice successfully reveals a string x if Bob
accepts the opening of x, i.e. he performs a test de-
pending on the individual protocol to check Alice’s hon-
esty and concludes that she was indeed honest. Note
that quantumly, Alice can always commit to a superpo-
sition of different strings without being detected. Thus
even for a perfectly binding bit string commitment (i.e.
a = 0) we only demand that
∑
x∈{0,1}n p
A
x ≤ 1, whereas
classically one wants that pAx′ = δx,x′ . Note that our
concealing definition reflects Bob’s a priori knowledge
about x. We choose an a priori uniform distribution (i.e.
px = 2−n) for (n, a, b)-QBSCs, which naturally comes
from the fact that we consider n-bit strings. A general-
ization to any (PX , a, b)-QBSC where PX is an arbitrary
distribution is possible but omitted in order not to ob-
scure our main line of argument. Instead of Bob’s guess-
ing probability, one can take any information measure
B to express the security against Bob. In general, we
consider an (n, a, b)-QBSCB where the new concealing
condition B(E) ≤ b holds for any ensemble E = {px, ρx}
that Bob can obtain by a cheating strategy. In the latter
part of this paper we show that for B being the accessi-
ble information non-trivial protocols, i.e. protocols with
a + b  n, exist. The accessible information is defined
as Iacc(E) = maxM I(X;Y ), where PX is the prior dis-
tribution of the random variable X, Y is the random
variable of the outcome of Bob’s measurement on E , and
the maximization is taken over all measurements M .
B. Model
We work in the model of two-party non-relativistic
quantum protocols of Yao [2] and then simplified by Lo
and Chau [12] which is usually adopted in this context.
Here, any two-party quantum protocol can be regarded
as a pair of quantum machines (Alice and Bob), interact-
ing through a quantum channel. Consider the product of
three Hilbert spaces HA, HB and HC of bounded dimen-
sions representing the Hilbert spaces of Alice’s and Bob’s
machines and the channel, respectively. Without loss of
generality, we assume that each machine is initially in
a specified pure state. Alice and Bob perform a num-
ber of rounds of communication over the channel. Each
such round can be modeled as a unitary transformation
on HA ⊗HC and HB ⊗HC respectively. Since the pro-
tocol is known to both Alice and Bob, they know the
set of possible unitary transformations used in the pro-
tocol. We assume that Alice and Bob are in possession
of both a quantum computer and a quantum storage de-
vice. This enables them to add ancillae to the quantum
machine and use reversible unitary operations to replace
measurements. By doing so, Alice and Bob can delay
measurements and thus we can limit ourselves to proto-
cols where both parties only measure at the very end.
Moreover, any classical computation or communication
that may occur can be simulated by a quantum com-
puter. Furthermore, any probabilistic operation can be
modeled as an operation that is conditional on the out-
come of a coin flip. Instead of a classical coin, we can use
a quantum coin and in this way keep the whole system
fully quantum mechanical.
C. Tools
We now gather the essential ingredients for our proof.
First, we show that every (n, a, b)-QBSC is an (n, a, b)-
QBSCξ. The security measure ξ(E) is defined by
ξ(E) ≡ n−H2(ρAB |ρ), (1)
where ρAB =
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx and ρ =
∑
x pxρx are
only dependent on the ensemble E = {px, ρx}. H2(·|·)
is an entropic quantity defined in [34] H2(ρAB |ρ) ≡
− log Tr((I ⊗ ρ− 12 )ρAB)2. This quantity is directly con-
nected to Bob’s maximal average probability of successful
guessing the string:
Lemma 1 Bob’s maximal average probability of
successfully guessing the committed string, i.e.
supM
∑
x pxp
B,M
x|x where M ranges over all mea-
surements and pB,My|x is the conditional probability of
guessing y given ρx, obeys
sup
M
∑
x
pxp
B,M
x|x ≥ 2−H2(ρAB |ρ).
Proof. By definition the maximum average guess-
ing probability is lower bounded by the average guessing
probability for a particular measurement strategy. We
choose the square-root measurement which has operators
Mx = pxρ−
1
2 ρxρ
− 12 . pBx|x = Tr(Mxρx) is the probability
that Bob guesses x given ρx, hence
log2
∑
x
pxp
B,max
x|x ≥ log2
∑
x
p2xTr(ρ
− 12 ρxρ−
1
2 ρx)
= log Tr
([
(I⊗ ρ− 12 )ρAB
]2)
= −H2(ρAB |ρ)
2
Related estimates were derived in [35]. For the uni-
form distribution px = 2−n we have from the concealing
condition that
∑
x p
B
x|x ≤ 2b which by Lemma 1 implies
ξ(E) ≤ b and hence the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Every (n, a, b)-QBSC is an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ.
Furthermore, we make use of the following theorem,
known as privacy amplification against a quantum ad-
versary. In our case, Bob holds the quantum memory
and privacy amplification is used to find Alice’s attack.
4Theorem 1 (Th. 5.5.1 in [34] (see also [36])) Let
G be a class of two-universal hash functions from {0, 1}n
to {0, 1}s. Application of g ∈ G to the random variable
X maps the ensemble E = {px, ρx} to Eg = {qgy , σgy}
with probabilities qgy =
∑
x∈g−1(y) px and quantum states
σgy =
∑
x∈g−1(y) pxρx. Then
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
d(Eg) ≤ 122
− 12 [H2(ρAB |ρ)−s], (2)
where d(E) ≡ δ(∑x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx, I/2n ⊗ ρ) (and simi-
larly for d(Eg)) and δ(α, β) ≡ 12 ||α − β||1 with ||A||1 =
Tr
√
A†A.
Finally, the following reasoning, previously used to
prove the impossibility of quantum bit commitment [11,
12], will be essential: Suppose ρ0 and ρ1 are density op-
erators that correspond to a commitment of a “0” or a
“1” respectively. Let |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 be the corresponding
purifications on the joint system of Alice and Bob. If ρ0
equals ρ1 then Alice can find a local unitary transforma-
tion U that she can apply to her part of the system and
satisfying |φ1〉 = U ⊗ I|φ0〉. This enables Alice to change
the total state from |φ0〉 to |φ1〉 and thus cheat. This
also holds in an approximate sense [11], used here in the
following form:
Lemma 3 Let δ(ρ0, ρ1) ≤  and assume that the bit-
commitment protocol is error-free if both parties are hon-
est. Then there is a method for Alice to cheat such that
the probability of successfully revealing a 0 given that she
committed to a 1 is greater or equal to 1−√2.
Proof. δ(ρ0, ρ1) ≤  implies F (ρ0, ρ1) ≥ 1 − .
F (·, ·) is the fidelity of two quantum states, which equals
maxU |〈φ0|U ⊗ I|φ1〉| by Uhlmann’s theorem. Here, |φ0〉
and |φ1〉 are the joint states after the commit phase and
the maximization ranges over all unitaries U on Alice’s
(i.e. the purification) side. Let |ψ0〉 = U ⊗ I|φ1〉 for a U
achieving the maximization. Then
δ(|φ0〉〈φ0|, |ψ0〉〈ψ0|) =
√
1− |〈φ0|ψ0〉|
≤
√
1− (1− )2
≤
√
2.
If both parties are honest, the reveal phase can be re-
garded as a measurement resulting in a distribution
PY (PZ) if |φ0〉 (|ψ0〉) was the state before the reveal
phase. The random variables Y and Z carry the opened
bit or the value ‘reject (r)’. Since the trace distance
does not increase under measurements, δ(PY , PZ) ≤
δ(|φ0〉〈φ0|, |ψ0〉〈ψ0|) ≤
√
2. Hence 12 (|PY (0) − PZ(0)| +
|PY (1) − PZ(1)| + |PY (r) − PZ(r)|) ≤
√
2. Since |φ0〉
corresponds to Alice’s honest commitment to 0 we have
PY (0) = 1, PY (1) = PY (r) = 0 and hence PZ(0) ≥
1−√2. 2
II. IMPOSSIBILITY
The proof of our impossibility result consists of three
steps: in the previous section, we saw that any (n, a, b)-
QBSC is also an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ with the security mea-
sure ξ(E) defined eq. (1). Below, we prove that an
(n, a, b)-QBSCξ can only exist for values a, b and n obey-
ing a+b+c ≥ n, where c is a small constant independent
of a, b and n. This in turn implies the impossibility of an
(n, a, b)-QBSC for such parameters. At the end of this
section we show that many executions of the protocol can
only be secure if a+ b ≥ n.
The intuition behind our main argument is simple: To
cheat, Alice first chooses a two-universal hash function
g. She then commits to a superposition of all strings
for which g(x) = y for a specific y. We know from the
privacy amplification theorem above, however, that even
though Bob may gain some knowledge about x, he is
entirely ignorant about y. But then Alice can change
her mind and move to a different set of strings for which
g(x) = y′ with y 6= y′ as we saw above! The following
figure illustrates this idea.
x1
x2
x3
x4 x5
x6
x10 x12
x11
x8 x7x9
x15x14
x13
g(x)=1
g(x)=2
g(x)=3
g(x)=4
g(x)=5
FIG. 1: Moving from y to y′.
Theorem 2 (n, a, b)-QBSCξ schemes, and thus also
(n, a, b)-QBSC schemes, with a + b + c < n do not ex-
ist. c is a constant equal to 5 log2 5− 4 ≈ 7.61.
Proof. Consider an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ and the case where
both Alice and Bob are honest. Alice committed to x.
We denote the joint state of the Alice-Bob-Channel sys-
tem HA ⊗HB ⊗HC after the commit phase by |φx〉 for
input state |x〉. Let ρx be Bob’s reduced density matrix
and let E = {px, ρx} where px = 2−n.
Assuming that Bob is honest, we will give a cheating
strategy for Alice in the case where a+b+5 log2 5−4 < n.
The strategy will depend on the two-universal hash func-
tion g : X = {0, 1}n → Y = {0, 1}n−m, for appropri-
ately chosen m. Alice picks a y ∈ Y and prepares the
state (
∑
x∈g−1(y) |x〉|x〉)/
√|g−1(y)|. She then gives the
second half of this state as input to the protocol and
stays honest for the rest of the commit phase. The joint
5state of Alice and Bob at the end of the commit phase
is thus |ψgy〉 = (
∑
x∈g−1(y) |x〉|φx〉)/
√|g−1(y)|. The re-
duced states on Bob’s side are σgy =
1
qgy
∑
x∈g−1(y) pxρx
with probability qgy =
∑
x∈g−1(y) px. We denote this en-
semble by Eg. Let σ = σg =
∑
y q
g
yσ
g
y for all g.
We now apply Theorem 1 with s = n−m and ξ(E) ≤ b
to obtain 1|G|
∑
g∈G d(Eg) ≤ ε where ε = 122−
1
2 (m−b).
Hence, there is at least one g such that d(Eg) ≤ ε; intu-
itively, this means that Bob knows only very little about
the value of g(x). This g defines Alice’s cheating strategy.
It is straightforward to verify that d(Eg) ≤ ε implies
2−(n−m)
∑
y
δ(σ, σgy) ≤ 2ε. (3)
Let us therefore assume without loss of generality that
Alice chooses y0 ∈ Y with δ(σ, σgy0) ≤ 2ε.
Clearly, the probability to successfully reveal some x
in g−1(y) given |ψgy〉 is one. Note that Alice learns x, but
can’t pick it: she committed to a superposition and x is
chosen randomly by measurement. Thus the probability
to reveal y (i.e. to reveal an x such that y = g(x)) given
|ψgy〉 successfully is one. Let p˜x and q˜gy denote the prob-
abilities to successfully reveal x and y respectively and
p˜gx|y be the conditional probability to successfully reveal
x, given y. We have∑
x
p˜x =
∑
y
q˜gy
∑
x∈g−1(y)
p˜gx|y ≥
∑
y
q˜gy .
Recall that Alice can transform |ψgy0〉 approximately
into |ψgy〉 if σgy0 is sufficiently close to σgy by applying lo-
cal transformations to her part alone. It follows from
Lemma 3 that we can estimate the probability of reveal-
ing y, given that the state was really |ψy0〉. Since this
reasoning applies to all y, on average, we have∑
y
q˜gy ≥
∑
y
(1− 2 12 δ(σgy0 , σgy)
1
2 )
≥ 2n−m − 2 12 2n−m(2m−n∑
y
δ(σgy0 , σ
g
y)
) 1
2
≥ 2n−m[1− 2 12 (2m−n(
∑
y
δ(σgy0 , σ) + δ(σ, σ
g
y)))
1
2 ]
≥ 2n−m(1− 2(2ε) 12 ),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3, the sec-
ond from Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of the
square root function, the third from the triangle inequal-
ity and the fourth from eq. (3) and δ(σgy0 , σ) ≤ 2ε. Re-
call that to be secure against Alice, we require 2a ≥
2n−m(1 − 2(2ε) 12 ). We insert  = 122−
1
2 (m−b), define
m = b+ γ and take the logarithm on both sides to get
a+ b+ δ ≥ n, (4)
where δ = γ − log2(1 − 2−γ/4+1). Keeping in mind that
1 − 2−γ/4+1 > 0 (or equivalently γ > 4), we find that
the minimum value of δ for which eq. (4) is satisfied is
δ = 5 log2 5− 4 and arises from γ = 4(log2 5− 1). Thus,
no (n, a, b)-QBSCξ with a+ b+ 5 log2 5− 4 < n exists. 2
Since the constant c does not depend on a, b and n,
multiple parallel executions of the protocol in the form
of multiple simultaneous commit phases followed by the
corresponding opening phases, can only be secure if a+
b ≥ n:
Proposition 1 Let P be an (n, a, b)-QBSCξ or (n, a, b)-
QBSC. The m-fold parallel execution of P will be inse-
cure if a+b < n−c/m. In particular, no (n, a, b)-QBSCξ
or (n, a, b)-QBSC with a+ b < n can be executed securely
an arbitrary number of times in parallel. Furthermore,
no (n, a, b)-QBSCχ with a+ b < n and χ the Holevo in-
formation can be executed securely an arbitrary number
of times in parallel.
Proof. In the following, we assume wlog that a and b
are the smallest cheat parameters for P . Let Q denote
the (nm, am, bm)-QBSCξ or (nm, am, bm)-QBSC proto-
col obtained by executing P m times in parallel. By
Theorem 2, Q is insecure if am + bm < nm − c. Since
a and b were assumed to be the smallest cheat parame-
ters for P , the product cheating attack by Alice and Bob
lead to the estimates am ≥ am and bm ≥ bm, respec-
tively. Therefore, the m fold execution of P is insecure,
if am+ bm ≤ am + bm < nm− c or a+ b < n− c/m.
In order to prove the result about Holevo information
QBSC, we will use a slightly different characterisation
of privacy amplification in the proof of Theorem 2. In
this characterisation, the right hand side of eq. (2) is
replaced by κ+ 2−
1
2 [H
κ
min(ρAB |ρB)−s] for an arbitrary κ >
0 [34, Corollary 5.6.1]. Going through the proof with this
change in mind, one sees that Q is not a (nm, am, bm)-
QBSCΞ for Ξ(E˜) = nm−Hκmin(ρ˜AB |ρ˜) if am + bm + δ ≤
mn. Here, E˜ is the ensemble corresponding to Q and ρ˜AB
and ρ˜ the related states; δ ≡ δ(κ) is a positive constant
independent of n. Since E˜ = E⊗m and thus ρ˜AB = ρ⊗mAB
and ρ˜AB = ρ⊗mAB we are able to invoke the estimate
1
m
Hκmin(ρ
⊗m
AB |ρ⊗m) ≥ H(ρAB)−H(ρ)− 3λ
where λ(κ,m)→ 0 asm→∞ [34, Chain rule in Theorem
3.1.12 and Theorem 3.3.4] in order to conclude that Q is
not a (nm, am, bm)-QBSCm(χ(E)+2λ) if am+bm+δ < mn.
This shows that if P is a (nm, am, bm)-QBSCm(χ(E)+2λ)
with αmm+ βmm ≤ am + bm < nm− δ, i.e. αm + βm <
n − δ/m, then its m-fold execution cannot be secure.
Takingm to infinity we see that if P is an (n, a, b)-QBSCχ
with a + b < n then it cannot be executed securely an
arbitrary number of times in parallel. 2
It follows directly from [37] that the results in this
section also hold in the presence of superselection rules.
6III. POSSIBILITY
Surprisingly, if one is willing to measure Bob’s ability
to learn x using the accessible information, non-trivial
protocols become possible. These protocols are based on
a discovery known as “locking of classical information in
quantum states” [18].
A. A Family of Protocols
The protocol, which we call LOCKCOM(n, U), uses
this effect and is specified by a set U = {U1, . . . , U|U|} of
unitaries.
• Commit phase: Alice has the string x ∈ {0, 1}n and
randomly chooses r ∈ {1, . . . , |U|}. She sends the
state Ur|x〉 to Bob, where Ur ∈ U .
• Reveal phase: Alice announces r and x. Bob ap-
plies U†r and measures in the computational basis
to obtain x′. He accepts if and only if x′ = x.
We first show that our protocol is secure with respect
to Definition 1 if Alice is dishonest. Note that our proof
only depends on the number of unitaries used, and is
independent of a concrete instantiation of the protocol.
Lemma 4 Any LOCKCOM(n,U) protocol is log(|U|)-
binding, i.e. 2a ≤ |U|,
Proof. Let pAx denote the probability that Alice re-
veals x successfully. Then, pAx ≤
∑
r p
A
x,r, where p
A
x,r is
the probability that x is accepted by Bob when the re-
veal information was r. Let ρ denote the state of Bob’s
system. Summation over x now yields∑
x
pAx ≤
∑
x,r
pAx,r
=
∑
x,r
Tr|x〉〈x|U†rρUr
=
∑
r
Trρ = |U|,
hence a ≤ log2 |U| 2
In order to examine security against a dishonest Bob,
we have to consider the actual form of the unitaries.
We first show that there do indeed exist interesting pro-
tocols. Secondly, we present a simple, implementable,
protocol. To see that interesting protocols can exist,
let Alice choose a set of O(n4) unitaries independently
according to the Haar measure (approximated) and an-
nounce the resulting set U to Bob. They then perform
LOCKCOM(n,U). Following the work of [38], we now
show that this variant is secure against Bob with high
probability in the sense that there exist O(n4) unitaries
that bring Bob’s accessible information down to a con-
stant: Iacc(E) ≤ 4:
Theorem 3 For n ≥ 3, there exist (n, 4 log2 n+O(1), 4)-
QBSCIacc protocols.
Proof. Let Uran denote the set of m randomly cho-
sen bases and consider the LOCKCOM(n, a, b) scheme
using unitaries U = Uran. Security against Alice is again
given by Lemma 4. We now need to show that this choice
of unitaries achieves the desired locking effect and thus
security against Bob. Again, let d = 2n denote the di-
mension. It was observed in [18] that
Iacc ≤ log2 d+ max|φ〉
∑
i
1
m
H(Xj),
where Xj denotes the outcome of the measurement of |φ〉
in basis j and the maximum is taken over all pure states
|φ〉. According to [38, Appendix B] there is a constant
C ′ > 0 such that
Pr[inf
|φ〉
1
m
m∑
j=1
H(Xj) ≤ (1− ) log2 d− 3]
≤
(
10

)2d
2−m
“
C′d
2(log2 d)2
−1
”
,
for d ≥ 7 and  ≤ 2/5. Set  = 1log2 d . The RHS of
the above equation then decreases provided that m >
8
C′ (log2 d)
4. Thus with d = 2n and log2m = 4 log2 n +
O(1), the accessible information is then Iacc ≤ log2 d −
(1− ) log2 d+ 3 =  log2 d+ 3 = 4 for our choice of . 2
Unfortunately, the protocol is inefficient both in terms
of computation and communication. It remains open to
find an efficient constructive scheme with those parame-
ters.
In contrast, for only two bases, an efficient construction
exists and uses the identity and the Hadamard transform
as unitaries. For this case, the security of the standard
LOCKCOM protocol follows immediately:
Theorem 4 LOCKCOM(n, {I⊗n, H⊗n}) is a
(n, 1, n/2)−QBSCIacc protocol.
Proof. It is sufficient to apply Lemma 4 and the fact
that for Bob Iacc ≤ n/2 [18, 39]. 2
IV. A CHEAT-SENSITIVE PROTOCOL
A. Scenario and Result
We now extend the protocol above to be cheat-sensitive
against Bob. That is, even though Bob may be able to
gain a lot of information on the committed string, Alice
has a decent probability of catching Bob if he actually
tries to extract such information [47].
We first extend our definition to accommodate cheat-
sensitivity against Bob.
7Definition 2 A (n, a, b)-B-QBSC is cheat-sensitive
against Bob if there is a non-zero probability that he will
be detected by Alice when he cheats.
We elaborate below on the scenario in which we analyse
Bob’s cheating and thus make precise what we mean by
saying Bob cheats.
The following protocol is a modification of
LOCKCOM(n,U) which incorporates cheat-sensitivity
against Bob.
Protocol 1: CS-Bob-LOCKCOM(n,U)
1: Commit phase: Alice randomly chooses the
string x ∈ {0, 1}n and a unitary Ur from a set of
unitaries U known to both Alice and Bob. She
sends the state Ur|x〉.
2: Reveal phase: Alice sends r to Bob, he applies
(Ur)† to the state that he received from Alice
and measures in the computational basis. His
outcome is denoted by y.
3: Confirmation phase: Bob sends y to Alice. If
Alice is honest, and if x = y she declares ‘accept’
otherwise ‘abort’.
We proved in Theorem 4 that CS-Bob-
LOCKCOM(n, {I⊗n, H⊗n}) is a (n, 1, n/2)-Iacc-quantum
string commitment protocol. In fact this result can be
extended to dimensions different from d = 2n where
one can show that CS-Bob-LOCKCOM(log2 d, {I, U}),
where U is the Fourier transform, is a (log2 d, 1,
log2 d
2 )-
Iacc-quantum string commitment protocol.
We now restrict our attention to this protocols and
prove that a dishonest Bob is detected whenever he has
obtained a non-zero amount of information about x be-
fore the reveal stage [48] . More precisely, we give
a tradeoff for cheat detection versus Holevo-information
gain against a dishonest Bob, with the property that ev-
ery nonzero Holevo-information gain leads to a nonzero
detection probability of Bob.
Theorem 5 If Bob is detected cheating with probability
less than , then his Holevo information gain obeys
χ(EC) ≤ 4√ log2 d+ 2µ(2
√
).
As a corollary we find that CS-Bob-
LOCKCOM(log2 d, {I, U}) is cheat sensitive against
Bob.
Corollary 1 Bob will be detected cheating with a
nonzero probability, if he gathers a nonzero amount of
Holevo information.
B. Proof
We start this section with a description of the sequence
of events for the case where Alice is honest and Bob ap-
plies a general cheating strategy (see also Figure 2).
• The commit phase of the protocol
LOCKCOM(log2 d, {I, U}) is equivalent to
the following procedure: Alice prepares the state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2d
∑
x,r
|x〉X |r〉R|r〉R′Ur|x〉Y
on the system XRY R′ and sends system Y (over
a noiseless quantum channel) to Bob. It is under-
stood that U0 = I and U1 = U . Note that R′
contains an identical copy of R and corresponds to
the reveal information.
• Bob’s most general cheating operation can be de-
scribed by a unitary matrix Vcheat that splits the
system Y into C and Q. C contains by definition
the information gathered during cheating and is not
touched upon later on [48] .
Vcheat : Y → CQ
The map Vcheat followed by the partial trace over
Q is denoted by ΛC and likewise Vcheat followed by
the partial trace over C is denoted by ΛQ.
• Alice sends the reveal information R′ to Bob.
• Bob applies a preparation unitary Vprepare to his
system. Since C will not be touched upon, the
most general operation acts on R′Q only:
Vprepare : R′Q→ R′ST.
Bob then sends S to Alice and keeps T .
• Alice measures S in the computational basis and
compares the outcome to her value in X. If the
values do not agree, we say that Alice has detected
Bob cheating. The probability for this happening
is given by
1
d
d∑
x=1
(
1− Tr|x〉〈x|ρSx
)
,
where ρSx = TrXRR′T |x〉〈x||ψ〉〈ψ|XRR
′ST , and
|ψ〉XRR′ST is the pure state of the total system af-
ter Bob’s application of Vprepare.
Note that Alice measures in the computational basis since
for honest Bob Vprepare =
∑
r′∈{0,1} |r′〉〈r′| ⊗ (Ur)†, in
which case his outcome agrees with the committed value
of an honest Alice.
Before we start with the proof of Theorem 5, we define
ensembles depending on the classical information con-
tained in XR, i.e. for Z ∈ {C,Q}, define EZr = {px, ρZxr}
with
ρZxr =
1
pxpr
TrXRR′CQ\Z |xr〉〈xr||ψ〉〈ψ|XRR
′CQ
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of protocol execution with Bob cheating
FIG. 2: Execution of CS-Bob-LOCKCOM with honest Al-
ice on the left and cheating Bob on the right. Time flows
downwards.
and for Z ∈ {S, T} let EZr = {px, ρZxr} with
ρZxr = TrXRR′CST\Z |xr〉〈xr||ψ〉〈ψ|XRR
′CST .
Sometimes we are only interested in the ensemble aver-
aged over the values of r: for Z ∈ {C,Q, S, T}
EZ = {px, ρZx } where ρZx =
1
2
(
ρZx0 + ρ
Z
x1
)
. (5)
Let us now come to two technical lemmas, most no-
tably a channel uncertainty relation (Lemma 5) that was
discovered in connection with squashed entanglement:
Consider a uniform ensemble E0 = { 1d , |i〉}di=1 of ba-
sis states of a Hilbert space H and the ensemble E1 =
{ 1d , U |i〉}di=1 rotated with a unitary U . Application of
the completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map Λ
(with output in a potentially different Hilbert space) re-
sults in the two ensembles
Λ(E0) =
{
1
d
,Λ(|i〉〈i|)
}
Λ(E1) =
{
1
d
,Λ(U |i〉〈i|U†)
}
with Holevo information for E0 given by
χ(Λ(E0)) = H
(
1
d
∑
i
Λ(|i〉〈i|)
)
− 1
d
∑
i
H
(
Λ(|i〉〈i|))
and similarly for E1. Consider also the quantum mutual
information of Λ relative to the maximally mixed state
τ = 1d I, which is the average state of either E0 or E1:
I(τ ; Λ) = H
(
τ
)
+H
(
Λ(τ)
)−H((I⊗ Λ)(|ψd〉〈ψd|)),
where |ψd〉 is a maximally entangled state in dimension
d purifying τ .
Lemma 5 (Channel Uncertainty Relation [39])
Let U be the Fourier transform of dimension d, i.e. of
the Abelian group Zd of integers modulo d. More gener-
ally, U can be a Fourier transform of any finite Abelian
group labeling the ensemble E0, e.g. for d = 2`, and the
group Z`2, U = H⊗` with the Hadamard transform H of
a qubit. Then for all CPTP maps Λ,
χ
(
Λ(E0)
)
+ χ
(
Λ(E1)
) ≤ I(τ ; Λ). (6)
The following technical lemma is a technical conse-
quence of Fannes’ inequality.
Lemma 6 Let E = {pi, ρi = |ψi〉〈ψi|} be an ensemble
of pure states and E˜ = {pi, σi} be an ensemble of mixed
states, both on Cd. If
∑
i pi〈ψi|σi|ψi〉 ≥ 1− , then
|χ(E˜)− χ(E)| ≤ 4√ log2 d+ 2µ(2
√
),
where µ(x) = min{−x log2 x, 1e}.
Proof. The justification of the estimate
 ≥
∑
i
pi(1− Trρiσi) ≥
∑
i
piδ
2
i ≥
(∑
i
piδi
)2
,
where δi = δ(ρi, σi) is as follows: the second inequality
is a standard relation between the fidelity and the trace
distance and the third follows from the convexity of the
square function. Strong convexity of the trace distance
implies δ(ρ, σ) ≤ √. Fannes’ inequality will be applied
to the overall state
|H(ρ)−H(σ)| ≤ 2√ log2 d+ min{η(2
√
),
1
e
}
where η(x) = −x log2 x, and to the individual ones∑
i
pi|H(σi)−H(ρi)| ≤
(∑
i
piδi
)
2 log2 d+∑
i
pi min{η(2δi), 1
e
}
≤ √2 log2 d+ min{η(2
√
),
1
e
}
where the last inequality is true by the concavity of
η(x). Inserting these estimates in the Holevo χ quantities
9χ(E) = H(ρ) and χ(E˜) = H(σ) −∑i piH(σi) concludes
the proof. 2
Proof. [Proof of Theorem 5] Let E0 and E1 be defined as
in Lemma 5. In the commit phase of the protocol, Alice
chooses one of the ensembles (each with probability 12 ),
and one of the states in the ensemble (each with prob-
ability 1d ). The justifications for the following estimate
are given in a list below.
χ(EC0 ) + χ(EC1 ) (7)
= χ(ΛC(E0)) + χ(ΛC(E1)) (8)
≤ I(XRR′;C) (9)
= 2H(XRR′)− I(XRR′;Q) (10)
≤ 2H(XRR′)− χ(ΛQ(E0))− χ(ΛQ(E1)) (11)
= 2H(XR)− χ(EQ0 )− χ(EQ1 ) (12)
≤ 2H(XR)− χ(ΛS0 (EQ0 ))− χ(ΛS1 (EQ1 )) (13)
= 2H(XR)− χ(ES0 )− χ(ES1 ) (14)
≤ 2H(XR)− 2χ(ES). (15)
The justifications:
• Equality (8): By definition of the string commit-
ment scheme and the map ΛC : ECr = {px, ρCxr} =
{px,ΛC(Ur|x〉〈x|(U†)r)} =: ΛC(Er).
• Inequality (9): Application of Lemma 5 for the
map ΛC . Note that system XRR′ is a reference
system for the completely mixed state on system
Y on which the channel ΛC is applied. Hence
I(τ ; ΛC) = I(XRR′;C).
• Equality (10): Simple rewriting of the entropy
terms making use of the definition of quantum mu-
tual information and the purity of XRR′CQ.
• Inequality (11): Application of Lemma 5 for the
map ΛQ. Note that system XRR′ is a reference
system for the completely mixed state on system
Y on which the channel ΛQ is applied. Hence
I(τ ; ΛQ) = I(XRR′;Q).
• Equality (12): R′ is a copy of R: H(XRR′) =
H(XR). By definition of the string commit-
ment scheme and the map ΛQ: EQr = {px, ρQxr}
= {px,ΛQ(Ur|x〉〈x|(U†)r)}.
• Inequality (13) and equality (14): follow from the
data processing inequality χ(ΛH(EQr )) ≤ χ(EQr )
and from the definition ΛH(EQr ) = ESr .
• Inequality (15): Finally ES = {px, ρSx =
1
2
(
ρSx0 + ρ
S
x1
)}, which by the concavity of von Neu-
mann entropy implies χ(ES) ≤ 12
(
χ(ES0 ) + χ(ES1 )
)
.
If Bob is detected cheating with probability less than
, then by Lemma 6 the Holevo quantity χ(ES) of the
ensemble given in S that Bob sends to Alice obeys
χ(ES) ≥ (1− 4√) log d− 2µ(2√). (16)
Inserting inequality (16) into inequality (15) and noting
that H(XR) = H(Y ) = log2 d proves the claim. 2
This proves cheat-sensitivity against Bob for the simplest
protocol of the LOCKCOM family.
V. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a framework for quantum com-
mitments to a string of bits. Even though string com-
mitments are weaker than bit commitments, we showed
that under strong security requirements, there are no
such non-trivial protocols. A property of quantum states
known as locking, however, allowed us to propose mean-
ingful protocols for a weaker security demand. Since
the completion of our original work [40], Tsurumaru [41]
has also proposed a different QBSC protocol within our
framework.
Furthermore, we have shown that one such protocol
can be made cheat-sensitive. It is an interesting open
question to derive a tradeoff between Bob’s ability to gain
information and Alice’s ability to detect him cheating for
the protocol of Theorem 3 as well.
A drawback of weakening the security requirement is
that LOCKCOM protocols are not necessarily compos-
able. Thus, if LOCKCOM is used as a sub-protocol in
a larger protocol, the security of the resulting scheme
has to be evaluated on a case by case basis. However,
LOCKCOM protocols are secure when executed in par-
allel. This is a consequence of the definition of Alice’s
security parameter and the additivity of the accessible in-
formation [42, 43], and sufficient for many cryptographic
purposes.
However, two important open questions remain: First,
how can we construct efficient protocols using more than
two bases? It may be tempting to conclude that we could
simply use a larger number of mutually unbiased bases,
such as given by the identity and Hadamard transform.
Yet, it has been shown [44] that using more mutually
unbiased bases does not necessarily lead to a better lock-
ing effect and thus better string commitment protocols.
Second, are there any real-life applications for this weak
quantum string commitment?
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